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In the world of strategic intelligence no issue is more important than 
predicting the most likely course of events, especially those that will impact on 
national security. In the jargon of intelligence this is often called the process of 
"estimation," and in the United States this process involves critical elements at the 
very top of the US Intelligence community. Few writers on intelligence have more 
familiarity with this process than Harold P. Ford, a veteran US intelligence officer 
and early practitioner of intelligence estimating. 
Ford's book is an outgrowth of a handbook written for the Defense Intelli-
gence College (now the Joint Military Intelligence College) in Washington. In it, 
Ford sets out to explain why estimates are written and how the process of creating 
them works. In that sense his book is good history and an accurate depiction of 
America's intelligence bureaucracy in action. It does not, however, explain much 
about how an intelligence officer might go about actually predicting the future, a 
serious omission in a handbook of this sort. 
Ford begins with Pearl Harbor, a seminal event in US intelligence history and 
one that has shaped thinking about intelligence in general and estimates in 
particular, ever since that day in 1941 that still lives "in infamy." In fact, the creators 
of the Central Intelligence Agency hoped to establish a system that would permit no 
more Pearl Harbors. Their failure to do so says a great deal about the difficulties of 
estimative intelligence. 
Early in the book Ford creates a Special National Intelligence Estimate 
(SNIE) on Pearl Harbor — to show what might have been written if the US had 
actually had a CIA in 1941. While some historians now argue that Pearl Harbor was 
a failure in the collection of data and not a failure of analysis, Ford's SNIE shows 
how judgments might have been made that would at least have caused American 
forces to move to a higher state of alert in 1941. But, there is no way to tell if such 
an SNIE would have actually prevented a surprise. 
The book moves on to describe the history of the US estimates organiza-
tion, from the Research and Analysis arm of the Office of Strategic Services in 
World War II to the Office of National Estimates in the early days of the Cold War. 
Ford mentions only in passing the "College of Cardinals," General Donovan's 
name for the group of estimators in the OSS. This reliance on "wise men" to judge 
the future led to the creation of the Board of National Estimates in the CIA. The 
"wise men" proved to be of limited wisdom in failing to anticipate the North 
Korean attack on the South in 1950 or the emplacement of nuclear missiles in 
Cubain 1962. 
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Ford completes his bureaucratic history by explaining the shift from the 
Board of National Estimates (at the end joined by a woman, but not without some 
fuss within the CIA) to the present system of the National Intelligence Council. 
This is an accurate explanation by someone who was in the middle of the events 
he describes. 
Much of Ford's book focuses not only on creating and coordinating National 
Estimates within the intelligence system, but on the critical process of deli vering the 
judgements to policy makers. Ford picks up many of the comments that astute 
observers, such as Richard K. Betts and Robert M. Gates, the former Director of 
Central Intelligence, have made about this aspect of estimating, and Ford includes 
in an annex articles each has written on the subject. Ford's inclusion of the Gates 
piece is particularly ironic, in that Ford actually testified against the confirmation 
of Gates at the DCI's confirmation hearings in 1991. 
Ford concludes his book with a discussion of what the estimates process 
might look like in the future, especially as new systems for electronic delivery of 
intelligence become more feasible. Until now, electronic delivery has been 
hampered by concerns about security as well as the limited computer literacy of 
policy consumers. Clearly this is beginning to change as a new generation of 
intelligence consumers, trained in youth on video games, comes to Washington. 
Despite his insights and his experience, Ford fails to explain the greatest 
problem in intelligence. The difficulty lies not only in predicting the future, in a 
world of many variables, incomplete data, and intentional deception, but in 
convincing policy makers that the prediction is valid. Intelligence estimators have 
tried a variety of methodologies, from the "seat-of-the-pants" reasoning to complex 
mathematical models. Ford mentions these strategies but spends little time 
discussing them. 
Throughout the Cold War the track record of intelligence estimating, at 
least in US intelligence, was admirable but unheralded, since historians only 
seemed to remember Pearl Harbor and other failures. Perhaps we fail to 
remember success because we do not learn about the content of an estimate 
unless there is a crisis. With a new emphasis on release of historical documents 
from the CIA, some of these successes may become known and the thinking of 
estimators more familiar. 
And perhaps there is a more fundamental flaw. It may be that the concept 
described by Ford—that wise analysts, given good data, can predict the future with 
consistency—is just impossible. Certainly the estimators will be successful in their 
predictions a great deal of the time, but policy makers won't know how accurate 
their predictions are until after the events. In hindsight, it's easy to see where 
estimators might have gone wrong. 
Through the ages policy makers have sought ways to know the future, 
from examining the entrails of goats to the modern system explained in 
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bureaucratie detail by Hal Ford. Ford's handbook may very well be the bible 
of an old religion. Policy makers may have to accept the fact that all intelligence 
estimators can really hope to do is to give them guidelines or scenarios to 
support policy discussion, and not the predictions they so badly want and expect 
from intelligence. 
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Stiller, Werner. Beyond the Wall: Memoirs of an East and West German Spy. 
McLean, VA: Brassey's (US), 1992. 
Werner Stiller is not unlike Winston Smith. The main difference, of course, 
is that George Orwell's character existed only in 1984. In his book, Beyond the 
Wall: Memoirs of an East and West German Spy, (translated and annotated by 
Jefferson Adams) Stiller tells of his days as an agent in the East German Ministry 
for State Security (the Stasi) where he was responsible for the recruitment of 
Western agents, particularly those involved in scientific research. Stiller traces his 
life from the time of his recruitment as a student at the Karl Marx University of 
Leipzig, to his escape to the West in 1979. Underlying his account is the ideological 
struggle that he faced. Like Smith, Stiller found himself surrounded by a ubiquitous 
party that affected virtually every aspect of his life. It was primarily the disillusion-
ment with the party, the increasing realization that the Stasi existed to protect those 
in power and not the community, that led Stiller to pursue contact with the West 
German Secret Service. Stiller embodies the essence of the Cold War. 
Beyond the Wall offers both the general reader and the intelligence scholar 
insight into the inner workings of the East German Secret Service. Although certain 
details had to be omitted for the sake of the security of those involved, Stiller 
nonetheless explains a wide spectrum of issues, ranging from the techniques of 
transmitting messages to the West, to the Stasi's international role in the Cold War. 
With regards to this role, Stiller evokes the tension of the Cold War and confirms 
the West's fears. Among other aspects, he discusses the fact that détente was simply 
another stage of war for East Germany, and that the West German anti-nuclear 
movement was penetrated in an effort to influence public opinion and threaten the 
fundamental political stability of West Germany. 
However, one must be cautious about Stiller's anti-Communist stance. 
During the course of the book, the reader realizes that Stiller was not only 
disillusioned with the Communist regime, but crusaded against it: wanting to defect 
to die West and deal a crucial blow to the stability of the party. Due to his 
disenchantment, he paints a dismal picture of the German Democratic Republic. 
Whether it is the state of workers' housing in Halle, or the level of scientific research 
at the Dresden Technical University, Stiller is highly critical. As Stiller relies solely 
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